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## Notes on the *Rūpa* Section of the *Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā*

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This paper focuses on the section on “matter” (*rūpa*) in Sthiramati’s *Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā* and its root text, Vasubandhu’s *Pañcaskandhaka*, providing an overview of the contents and comparing the *Pañcaskandhaka(vibhāṣā)*’s positions with parallel explanations found in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, and the *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya*.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, two other commentaries on the *Pañcaskandhaka* have been consulted, the *Pañcaskandhavivaraṇa* and the *Pañcaskandhabhāṣya*, both available only in their Tibetan translations. The latter two works have been accounted for in the present study whenever their doctrinal standpoints differ from Sthiramati or when they appear relevant for other reasons.

Sthiramati opens his commentary on the “heap of matter” (*rūpaskandha*) with the statement that it is impossible to determine the “own existence” (*svabhāva*) of the *skandhas* due to their lack of a *svabhāva*. But, according to Sthiramati, it is possible to expose the basis [of their designation] (*upādāna*), which in the case of *rūpaskandha* is *rūpa*.<sup>2</sup> Therefore, in the next passage of the text a detailed definition of the constituents of *rūpa* is given. The *Pañcaskandhaka* describes *rūpa* as the four basic elements (*mahābhūta*) and the matter that is dependent (*upādāya*) on them.<sup>3</sup> In his commentary Sthiramati first provides a number of arguments explaining the term *mahābhūta*:<sup>4</sup> The elements are qualified as *mahā-* because 1) they are “coarse” (*audārika*) serving as the basis for (subtle) dependent matter, 2) they are present (as solidity etc.) in all aggregations of visible matter etc., and 3) they are of great importance for the composition of matter. Moreover, the four are referred to as *bhūta* since 1) they come into existence in this or that appearance when the different kinds of dependent matter arise and

2) they have never been non-existent in the beginningless *saṃsāra*. In contrast to Sthiramati's commentary, the *Pañcaskandhavivaraṇa* and the *Pañcaskandhabhāṣya* relate the “greatness” of the *mahābhūtas* to the destruction of the different realms of the world.<sup>5</sup> The *Vivaraṇa* explains that the destruction by fire reaches up to the realms corresponding to the first *dhyāna*, the destruction by water up to the second *dhyāna*, and the destruction by wind up to the third.<sup>6</sup> The *Bhāṣya* assigns the first destruction (up to the first *dhyāna*) to water and the second (up to the second *dhyāna*) to fire. In addition, it connects the first destruction with desire (*rāga*), the second with hatred (*dveṣa*) and the third with delusion (*moha*).<sup>7</sup>

All three *Pañcaskandhaka* commentaries provide arguments aiming to prove that space (*ākāśa*) is not to be regarded as an additional basic element. Sthiramati's main assumption is that space is nothing other than the mere non-existence of impenetrable (*sapratigha*) *rūpa*, whereas the *Vivaraṇa* focuses on the idea that, contrary to the *mahābhūtas*, space does not benefit or harm living beings and, being permanent, it is not the result or cause of anything.<sup>8</sup> The *Bhāṣya* only mentions that in contrast to the *mahābhūtas* space is not subjected to the process of arising and ceasing.<sup>9</sup>

In connection with the explanation of matter dependent on the *mahābhūtas*, Sthiramati mentions five kinds of how matter derived from the elements (*bhautika*) is dependent on them: generating (*janana*), basis [of change] (*niśraya*), continuity (*pratiṣṭha*), support (*upastambha*), and nourishing (*brmhaṇa*).<sup>10</sup> The first of these five indicates that derived matter could not arise without the existence of the *mahābhūtas*.<sup>11</sup> The fact that the *mahābhūtas* are the basis of the matter derived from them means, according to Sthiramati, that dependent matter changes in the same moment as the elements change.<sup>12</sup> As long as the elements are produced in a certain continuum, the series of derived matter will not be interrupted—this is the meaning of the third kind of dependence, “continuity”.<sup>13</sup> The dependence consisting in “support” indicates that dependent matter does not cease to exist by the power of the *mahābhūtas*.<sup>14</sup> “Nourishing” points to the fact that dependent matter can only increase if the *mahābhūtas* it depends on grow.<sup>15</sup>

The definitions of the four *mahābhūtas* given by Sthiramati (in accordance with Vasubandhu) in the following section of the *Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā* closely resemble the explanations of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* and the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*. Solidity (*khakkhaṭatva*) is said to be the nature of earth, fluidity (*sneha*) the nature of water, heat (*ūṣmā*) the nature of fire, and lightness and motion (*laghusamudṭraṇatva*) the nature of wind.<sup>16</sup> The respective activities of the four *mahābhūtas* are support (*dhṛti*), cohesion (*saṃgraha*), ripening (*pakti*), and shifting (*vyūhana*).<sup>17</sup>

All three *Pañcaskandhaka* commentaries provide examples of how the presence of the four elements in certain objects can be inferred.<sup>18</sup> In this context Sthiramati explains that the existence of water, fire and air in a solid object like for instance a stone is obvious from its cohesion, its dryness (*pakti*; Tib. *skam pa*), and its ability to be moved. Remarkably, the *Pañcaskandhabhāṣya* argues differently with regard to the presence of fire in a stone adducing it from the appearance of sparks when two stones collide. The fact that water (as “normal” water, not as a basic element) also contains the elements earth, fire and wind is deducible from its ca-

capacity to support a piece of wood, from the fact that leaves etc. rot in it and that it can be warm,<sup>19</sup> and from the water's ability to flow. The presence of the other three elements in a burning fire is evident from the stability,<sup>20</sup> coherence, and the motion of the flames. And finally, wind consists of all four elements because it is able to support, for instance, leaves,<sup>22</sup> does not disperse, and dries clothes.

In addition to the examples of the simultaneous occurrence of all four *mahābhūtas* the *Pañcaskandhabhāṣya* quotes a passage from the *Garbhāvakraṅtisūtra* that discusses the results of one of the *mahābhūtas* not being present in an embryo:<sup>22</sup> If the water element is missing it dries up or disperses like flour or ashes. If the earth element is not present it flows out like oil. If there is no fire element it becomes rotten and without the wind element it does not increase or develop.

In the section on matter dependent on the basic elements, Sthiramati explains the meaning of pellucid matter (*rūpaprasāda*), which is the nature of the five material sense faculties.<sup>23</sup> He gives the example of images being reflected in a clear mirror or in a vessel filled with water. In the same way the pellucid matter of the five sense faculties reflects their objects.<sup>24</sup> Sthiramati mentions in this context that faith (*śraddhā*) is also considered as *prasāda*, but it is to be distinguished from the *indriyas* as it does not have matter (*rūpa*) for its nature.<sup>25</sup>

It is worth investigating the subsequent passage of the *Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā* which defines the objects of each sense faculty in detail, insofar as it reveals interesting dissimilarities between the *Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā*, the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, and the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*. First of all, the object of the sense of sight is discussed. The *Pañcaskandhaka* assigns three different categories to the visible (*rūpa*): colour (*varṇa*), shape (*saṃsthāna*), and representation (*viññapti*).<sup>26</sup> All three categories are mentioned in the parallel description found in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, whereas the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* only points out *varṇa* and *saṃsthāna* as parts of the visible and obviously places the bodily *viññapti* (*kāyaviññapti*) under *saṃsthāna*.<sup>27</sup> When going into details the *Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā*, the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, and the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* agree on four kinds of colour and eight kinds of shape.<sup>28</sup> But they disagree on the question whether entities like a cloud, smoke, or the sunlight are to be classified as separate categories, or whether they are already included in the categories of colour and of shape. In this context *AKBh* 6,12 mentions eight additional entities: cloud (*abhra*), smoke (*dhūma*), dust (*rajas*), mist (*mahikā*), shade (*chāyā*), sunlight (*ātapa*), (other) light (*āloka*), and darkness (*andhakāra*). In the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* space (*abhyavakāśa*), *viññapti*, and the sky (*nabhas*) as well as two further shapes, namely fine (*rdul phra mo*) and rough (*rags pa*) shape, are added to the eight entities mentioned in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*.<sup>29</sup> Sthiramati lists the entities from *abhra* to *nabhas* (omitting *viññapti*, which he mentions in another section), but he rejects them as separate constituents different from colour and shape. He argues that clouds, smoke etc. are either included in the category *saṃsthāna* in case they are limited or in the category *varṇa* in case they are not.<sup>30</sup> In contrast, the *Pañcaskandhavivaraṇa* and the *Pañcaskandhabhāṣya* list the additional items without pointing out their controversial nature. The *Pañcaskandhavivaraṇa* mentions *abhra* to *nabhas* (omitting *abhyavakāśa* and *viññapti*), the *Pañcaskandhabhāṣya* includes

the same list as the *Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā* (i.e. *abhra* to *nabhas*, omitting *vijñapti*) and adds brief explanations of some of the ten categories.<sup>31</sup>

While the *Pañcaskandhaka* mentions *vijñapti* as a third kind of visible *rūpa* beside colour and shape, the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* includes the definition of *vijñapti* in another context, namely in the fourth chapter, which deals with the topic “karma”. The *Abhidharmasamuccaya* mentions *vijñapti* as one of the 25 categories forming visible matter, but it does not characterize the matter of *vijñapti* in more detail. Sthiramati describes *vijñapti* as a bodily shape that arises from a mind which has this shape as its object and that is called *vijñapti* because it “makes known” the mind (i.e. the intention) by which it has been aroused.<sup>32</sup> The examination of *vijñapti* presented in the *Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā* and the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* shows that there was a dispute over the characterization of the bodily *vijñapti* (*kāyavijñapti*) within the different traditions. This discussion was related to the general question of whether shape (*saṃsthāna*) was to be regarded as a real entity (*dravya*), in the same way as *varṇa*, or as a designation for an accumulation of colour atoms arranged in a certain manner.<sup>33</sup> The first view (i.e. *saṃsthāna* being *dravyasat*) was held by the Vaibhāṣikas, who considered *kāyavijñapti* to be a kind of shape and therefore a real entity.<sup>34</sup> They classified *kāyavijñapti* as shape without there being colour.<sup>35</sup> The opposite view was taken by the Sautrāntikas, who maintained that *saṃsthāna* was a mere designation and that *kāyavijñapti* was shape not existing as a real entity.<sup>36</sup> A similar position is held by Sthiramati in the *Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā*. He also explains that shape does not exist as an entity and argues that this is evident for example from the fact that there are no differently shaped atoms in the same way as there are atoms of various colours. Therefore there are for instance no long-shaped atoms in an accumulation of atoms having a long shape.<sup>37</sup> Sthiramati takes shape to exist as a mere designation and not to constitute *vijñapti*, which he characterizes as “the uninterrupted arising of the continuum of the body at a different place” caused by an intention (and “making known” this intention to others).<sup>38</sup> Remarkably, Sthiramati adds that according to ultimate reality (*paramārthatas*) *varṇa*—in the same way as *saṃsthāna*—is not the object of the faculty of seeing. He argues that this is due to the fact that perception (*vijñāna*) does not have any outer objects, because the existence of colour atoms, like that of shape, is not possible from the viewpoint of that level.<sup>39</sup> This remark by Sthiramati is one of the very few statements in the *Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā* pointing to the doctrine of “representation only” (*vijñaptimātratā*).

The classifications of sound (*śabda*), the object of the faculty of hearing, differ in the *Pañcaskandhaka*(*vibhāṣā*), the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, and the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*. In this context it becomes obvious that Vasubandhu and Sthiramati did in some cases neither follow the tradition of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* nor that of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*. All four texts agree on two kinds of sound:<sup>40</sup>

1. the sound caused by the basic elements (*mahābhūtahetuka*) that are appropriated (*upātta*)
2. the sound caused by the basic elements that are not appropriated (*anupātta*)

The first kind of sound is identified as the sound of the voice (*vāc*) in the *Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā*, the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, and the *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya*.

The *Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā* and the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* additionally mention the sound of the (clapping) hand (*hasta*). The sound that is not appropriated is, according to the *Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā* and the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, the sound of the wind (*vāyu*), of the trees (*vanaspati*), or of the river (*nadī*).<sup>41</sup> The categorization of the remaining types of sound appears to have been controversial. The *Abhidharmasamuccaya* and the *Pañcaskandhaka* distinguish a third category of sound: the sound that is both, *upātta* and *anupātta*.<sup>42</sup> As an example for this kind of sound the *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya* and the *Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā* mention the sound of a hand and a drum (*mṛdaṅga*) (i.e. a hand hitting a drum).<sup>43</sup> Remarkably, this class of sound is rejected in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* as a separate category. There it is stated that “others” (*apare*) say that a sound can be appropriated and not appropriated at the same time, but this is not accepted, as it is not admitted that one atom is based on two tetrads of the basic elements (i.e. the four basic elements of the hand and the four basic elements of the drum).<sup>44</sup> This rejection of the sound that is both, appropriated and not appropriated, in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* is remarkable insofar as the author of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* is generally accepted to be identical to that of the *Pañcaskandhaka*.<sup>45</sup> What is more, two other kinds of sound mentioned in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* are absent in the *Pañcaskandhaka*. In *AKBh* 6,22 the class of sounds of living beings (*sattva*) and, finally, the sounds not belonging to living beings are listed additionally. The first of these two classes refers to the representation of speech (*vāgvijñāpti*), the second is described as including all other kinds of sound.<sup>46</sup> The *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* adds that all four of the mentioned sounds can be pleasant (*manojñā*) or unpleasant (*amanojñā*), which makes a total of eight different categories of sound.<sup>47</sup> In contrast, the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* lists five additional classes of sound besides the two categories mentioned above. They include sounds known in the world (*lokaprasiddha*), i.e. common talk (*laukikabhāṣā*), sounds produced by the *siddhas* (*siddhopanīta*), fabricated (*parikalpita*) sounds, and sounds belonging to the common practice of the Āryas (*āryavyāvahārika*) or to the common practice of the non-Āryas (*anāryavyāvahārika*).<sup>48</sup> All these sounds can be not only pleasant or unpleasant, as indicated in the explanation of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* mentioned above, but also neutral.<sup>49</sup> The *Pañcaskandhabhāṣya* lists only the three kinds of sounds mentioned in the *Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā*, whereas the third commentary on the *Pañcaskandhaka*, the *Pañcaskandhavivaraṇa*, additionally provides explanations of the same five sound classes as those appearing in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*.<sup>50</sup>

The sections on smell and taste consist of only three lines in the *Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā*. Nevertheless they are noteworthy as they differ from the respective passages in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* and the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*. The latter mentions four types of smell: good (*su-*) and bad smell (*durgandha*) which can both be either constant (*sama*) or inconstant (*viśama*). It is added, however, that in the *śāstra* (i.e. in the *Prakaraṇa*) three kinds of smell are taught: good, bad, and neutral (*sama*).<sup>51</sup> An almost identical statement is made by Vasubandhu in the *Pañcaskandhaka*, the “neutral” smell being indicated with the phrase “[smells] other than that”.<sup>52</sup> Sthiramati only explains the smell characterized as *sama* in his commentary, qualifying it as neither benefiting nor harming the basic elements of the sense of

smell.<sup>53</sup> In addition he refers to another definition, which describes smell as natural (*sahaja*), like the smell of sandalwood (*candana*) or saffron (*kuñkuma*), as arising from a combination (*sāmyogika*), like the smell of incense (*dhūpavarti*), and as arising from change (*pāriṇāmika*), like the smell of ripe mango fruits (*pakvāmrāphala*).<sup>54</sup> All six types of smell are listed in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, and in its commentary the last three are illustrated with the same examples of sandalwood, incense, and ripe fruits.<sup>55</sup> The same six categories are also mentioned in the *Pañcaskandhavivarāṇa* and the *Pañcaskandhabhāṣya*.<sup>56</sup>

In the case of taste, Sthiramati (in accord with Vasubandhu's root text) follows the classification of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, where six types are listed: sweet (*madhura*), sour (*amla*), salty (*lavaṇa*), pungent (*kaṭuka*), bitter (*tikta*), and astringent (*kaṣāya*).<sup>57</sup> He does not mention that taste, according to the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, can also be divided into the classes pleasant (*manojña*), unpleasant (*amanojña*), and neutral or, in analogy to the categories of smell, into *sahaja*, *sāmyogika*, and *pāriṇāmika*.<sup>58</sup> All these kinds of taste are mentioned also in the *Pañcaskandhavivarāṇa*, whereas the *Pañcaskandhabhāṣya* lists only the first six types. Both texts provide examples for tastes that are sweet, sour etc.<sup>59</sup>

When analysing the nature of the tangible, Sthiramati again is closer to the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* than to the definition of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, parts of which he even refutes explicitly. In *AKBh* 7,8f. eleven entities are mentioned as being tangible: the four *mahābhūtas*, softness (*ślakṣṇatva*), hardness (*karkaśatva*), heaviness (*gurutva*), lightness (*laghutva*), cold (*śīta*), hunger (*jighatsā*), and thirst (*pipāsā*). The explanation given in the *Pañcaskandhaka* is more differentiated because, in contrast to the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, *rūpa* is divided into the matter of the four *mahābhūtas* and the matter dependent on them. As the tangible is explained in the context of dependent matter, the mention of the four *mahābhūtas* as constituents of this category would contradict the classification (of *mahābhūta* versus dependent matter) made earlier. Therefore it is said in *PSk* 3,5 that only a part of the tangible (*spraṣṭavyaikadeśa*) is explained in this context. The *Abhidharmasamuccaya* does not mention the *mahābhūtas* under the topic of the tangible and explains that the latter consists of dependent matter including in addition to the seven entities "softness" etc. fifteen other categories like fainting (*mūrchā*), strength (*bala*), and weakness (*daurbalya*).<sup>60</sup> Sthiramati explains that these additional categories are not listed in the *Pañcaskandhaka* because they are already included in the remaining ones, like for example strength is included in hardness and heaviness and fainting in softness.<sup>61</sup> Neither the *Pañcaskandhavivarāṇa* nor the *Pañcaskandhabhāṣya* mention the additional items listed in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*. Notably, the *Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā* and the *Pañcaskandhabhāṣya* include a list showing the relations between the seven tangible categories, softness etc., and the four basic elements. According to this list softness is mainly a combination of water and fire, hardness of earth and wind, heaviness of earth and water, lightness of fire and wind, and cold of water and wind,<sup>62</sup> while hunger is mainly wind and thirst is for the most part fire.<sup>63</sup> Moreover, all three *Pañcaskandhaka* commentaries provide reasons for the fact that hunger and thirst, characterized as the causes for the desire to eat or to drink, are actually mental states and are nonetheless mentioned among the (material) objects of the sense of

touch: Hunger and thirst appear in the *rūpa* section as the results of their causes “wind” and “fire”, which undisputedly belong to the *rūpa* category. Sthiramati refers to this “figurative” usage of the terms as “applying the designation of the result (i.e. hunger) to the cause (i.e. wind)”.<sup>64</sup>

The third and last constituent of matter dependent on the basic elements is, according to the *Pañcaskandhaka*, the *avijñapti*, which is explained as “invisible and penetrable matter arisen from *vijñapti* or meditative absorption” (*vijñaptisamādhijaṃ rūpam anidarśanam apratigham*).<sup>65</sup> A similar statement appears in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, in which *avijñapti* is described as beneficial (*kuśala*) or unbeneficial (*akuśala*) matter, having arisen from *vijñapti* or *samādhi*.<sup>66</sup> Remarkably, the term *avijñapti* is not used in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*. Instead, the expression *sāmādānika* is applied to this kind of karmic matter in the context of the definition of five classes of matter belonging to the *dharmāyatana*.<sup>67</sup> However, the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* does not specify exactly what the matter belonging to the *sāmādānika* category is.

According to Sthiramati *avijñapti* that has arisen from *vijñapti* belongs to [the sphere of] sensual pleasure (*kāmāpta*) and can be divided into four classes: (1) the restraint (*saṃvara*) of the code of precepts (*prātimokṣa*), (2) the restraint of the Bodhisattva, (3) the non-restraint (*asaṃvara*), which is characterized as engaging completely in practice harming others, and (4) neither restraint nor non-restraint, which is described as partly engaging in beneficial and harmful [activities] (*ekadeś-enānugrahopaghātapravrṭti*).<sup>68</sup> This classification of *avijñapti* seems to be an extended adaptation of the analysis of it as found in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*. There *avijñapti* is structured into the three classes *saṃvara*, *asaṃvara*, and *naiva saṃvaro nāsaṃvaraḥ*.<sup>69</sup> The class of the *bodhisattvasaṃvara* is, as might be expected, missing in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*. It is notable in this context that the same structure of three classes is presented in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, however, not explicitly describing *avijñapti*, but the divisions of karma.<sup>70</sup> What is surprising here, is the fact that the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* does not mention the restraint of the Bodhisattva either.

The first category, *saṃvara*, is divided into three subclasses in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* and the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*.<sup>71</sup> The first of these is *prātimokṣasaṃvara*. The other two classes are the restraint of contemplation (*dhyānasamvara*) and the restraint of the uncontaminated (*anāsravasamvara*). These are the two categories that are described by Sthiramati as arising from meditative absorption (*samādhija*). The *avijñapti* that arises from meditative absorption belongs either to the material [sphere] (*rūpāpta*) or is the uncontaminated (*anāsrava*) *avijñapti*.<sup>72</sup> If it belongs to the *rūpadhātu* then it originates from contaminated meditative absorption (*sāsravasamādhija*) of the four contemplations (*dhyāna*), of [the stage] before attaining [the first *dhyāna*] (*anāgamya*), and of the states between the [first two] *dhyānas* (*dhyānāntara*). The *avijñapti* that is uncontaminated arises from uncontaminated meditative absorption (*anāsrava-samādhija*).<sup>73</sup>

In the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* the analysis of *avijñapti* is very comprehensive and the discussion of opposing views with regard to the nature of *avijñapti* is rather complex and difficult to understand.<sup>74</sup> In this context one of Vasubandhu’s main concerns seems to be to oppose the Vaibhāṣika theory that *avijñapti* is an existing entity (*dravya*) and is a component of the category



*rūpa*. Both these assumptions were rejected by the Sautrāntikas, whose arguments Vasubandhu employs to support his position. Sthiramati refers only briefly to this discussion<sup>75</sup> and seems to accept the view that *avijñapti* belongs to the category of matter. However, he does not accept the view of the Vaibhāṣikas that *avijñapti*, in the same way as *vijñapti*, exists as a real entity (*dravya*). At the same time he points out that this non-existence of *avijñapti* as a separate entity does not result in the non-existence of the different kinds of restraint etc.<sup>76</sup> The underlying explanation for this statement is probably to be found in the Vaibhāṣikas' objections to the claim that *avijñapti* cannot really exist and the Sautrāntikas' defense of their view of *avijñapti* not being a real entity, which are presented in detail by Vasubandhu in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*.<sup>77</sup> Sthiramati's argumentation seems to rely at least partly on the concept of the "store mind" (*ālayavijñāna*) and thus goes beyond Vasubandhu's line of reasoning. He, for instance, explains the concept of *saṃvara* to be an intention to restrain oneself from committing wrong deeds which is produced at the ordination ceremony and which leaves a seed in the *ālayavijñāna* and thus provides the source for future intentions of the same kind.<sup>78</sup> The functions of *asaṃvara* as well as of the *dhyāna*- and *anāsravasamvara* are, according to Sthiramati, also to be explained as the continuation of intentions to engage in certain activities, like doing harm to other beings on the one hand and the restraining from committing misdeeds on the other.<sup>79</sup>

A question that seems to be controversial to Sthiramati is whether there are any other kinds of matter comparable to *avijñapti*. The manner in which Sthiramati discusses this problem shows that the boundary between material and mental factors was disputed among the authors of Abhidharmic texts like the *Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā*, the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, and the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*. In the *Saṅgītisūtra* it is stated that there are three kinds of *rūpa*: one that is visible (*sanidarśana*) and impenetrable (*sapratigha*), one that is invisible and impenetrable, and one that is invisible and penetrable.<sup>80</sup> The *sūtra* does not explain, however, what exactly is meant by these three classes. The passage in question is quoted in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*,<sup>81</sup> and Sthiramati seems to refer to it in the *Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā* when he explains that all matter is threefold. He identifies visible and impenetrable matter with the object of the sense of sight, invisible and impenetrable matter with the five sense faculties as well as the objects of the other four senses (apart from the sense of sight), and finally the invisible and penetrable matter with the matter of *dharmāyatana*.<sup>82</sup> According to the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, the matter of *dharmāyatana* includes five entities: compressed (*ābhisaṃkṣepika*) matter, matter of space (*ābhyavakāśika*), matter of commitment (*sāmādānika*), imagined (*parikalpita*) matter, and matter produced by those with [meditative] power (*vaibhūtvika*).<sup>83</sup> The commentary explains matter that is *ābhisaṃkṣepika* as the matter of atoms (*paramāṇu*), whereas *ābhyavakāśika* is defined as referring to the matter of atoms being separated from other obstructing tangible [matter] (*tadanyaprativāraḥpraṣṭavyāra-hita*).<sup>84</sup> The term *sāmādānika* is explained as an alternative expression for the matter of *avijñapti*, and *parikalpita* is defined as indicating matter of meditative images (*pratibimba*), as for instance the image of a skeleton (*asthisamkalika*).<sup>85</sup> *Vaibhūtvika* is explained as referring to objects of those who are absorbed in the [eight] liberations (*vimokṣadhyāyigocara*).<sup>86</sup> Sthiramati rejects four of

these categories as belonging to *rūpa* and explains why he accepts only the *avijñapti* as invisible and penetrable matter. According to his argument, the first two categories, the *ābhisamkṣepika* and the *ābhyaṅgākāśika*, refer to matter of atoms and thus belong to the category of colour (which is part of the visible matter).<sup>87</sup> The objects of the last two categories, the *parikalpita* and the *vaibhūtvika*, are nothing other than mental images and are therefore to be regarded as being part of the mind.<sup>88</sup> Thus, in the case of invisible and penetrable matter Sthiramati explicitly rejects the teaching of five different entities given in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* and follows the tradition of just one entity falling under this category of matter. This tradition is also evident in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* where it seems to be presented as the position of the Vaibhāṣikas, who state that there is no other invisible and penetrable *rūpa* than *avijñapti*.<sup>89</sup> It is notable that Vasubandhu mentions in this context the view of some Yogācāras who claim that an image that is perceived in contemplation is matter that is invisible and penetrable.<sup>90</sup> However, the fivefold division of invisible and penetrable *rūpa* as explained in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* and the *Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā* is not mentioned in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*.

Finally, it should be noted that the explanations regarding *avijñapti* provided in the *Pañcaskandhavivaraṇa* and the *Pañcaskandhabhāṣya* resemble Sthiramati's presentation closely, although the *Vivaraṇa* is much shorter and does not explain the *saṃvara* concept in detail. Both commentaries do not mention the fivefold classification of invisible and penetrable matter and do not refer to the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*'s discussion of the existential status of *avijñapti*. The *Pañcaskandhabhāṣya* only includes some remarks on the *avijñapti*'s dependence on the four basic elements.<sup>91</sup> This topic is dealt with in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* in some detail and is indicated by Sthiramati in one sentence, in which he says that *avijñapti* is “dependent matter since it arises based on the basic elements and complies with them”.<sup>92</sup> The *Pañcaskandhabhāṣya*, moreover, lists (as the only *Pañcaskandhaka* commentary) reasons for giving up the various kinds of *saṃvara* as well as the *asaṃvara*.<sup>93</sup>

1. Four reasons for giving up the *prātimokṣasaṃvara*: giving up the discipline, death, occurrence of the male or female organ, taking up false views (plus a fifth reason for giving up temporary discipline: the end of one day and one night)
2. Two reasons for giving up the *bodhisattvasaṃvara*: giving up the restraint, taking up false views
3. Four reasons for giving up the *asaṃvara*: taking up a restraint, attaining an insight into true reality or seeing the truth, death, occurrence of the male or female organ
4. One reason for giving up “neither restraint nor non-restraint”: giving up an undertaking
5. One reason for giving up the restraint of meditative absorption and the *anāsravaṣaṃvara*: emerging from meditative absorption

This list seems to be related to a parallel explanation in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, in

which the causes for losing the different kinds of (non-)restraint (except for the restraint of the Bodhisattva) are discussed in detail.<sup>94</sup> The four reasons for giving up the *prātimokṣa* restraint are more or less identical in both texts, however, the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* lists “cutting off the roots of the beneficial” (*kuśalamūlasamuccheda*) instead of the taking up of wrong views. In connection with losing the *asaṃvara* the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* mentions only three reasons, omitting the insight into true reality, and with regard to “neither restraint nor non-restraint” six causes are discussed instead of one, the other five including cutting off the force of faith, cutting off an action, cutting off an object, death, and cutting off the roots of the beneficial. As for the last category, the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* additionally mentions in the context of giving up the restraint of contemplation the possibility of arising in a different level.

## Notes

1. Parts of this paper have been previously published in the *Nagoya Studies in Indian Culture and Buddhism: Saṃbhāṣā* 27, 2008, pp. 149-171. They are presented here in a revised and extended form. I would like to thank Jens-Uwe Hartmann and Ralf Kramer for offering very helpful comments and corrections to previous drafts of this paper.

2. *PSkV* 3b3f. The author of the *Pañcaskandhabhāṣya* also refers to this topic and notes that the relation between *rūpaskandha* and *rūpa* is comparable to that between heaps of barley or rice and barley and rice themselves (see *PSkBh* 34a5).

3. The same definition of *rūpa* is found in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*(*bhāṣya*) (*AS\** 3,12f. and *ASBh* 3,3f.). In contrast, the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* describes *rūpa* as consisting of the five sense faculties (*indriya*), their five objects (*artha*) and the *avijñapti* (*AKBh* 5,20-22). The four *mahābhūtas* are dealt with in a passage that follows the *rūpaskandha* section (*AKBh* 8,10ff.).

4. *PSkV* 3b5-4a1.

5. On the destructions, see GETHIN 1997, 196f.

6. *PSkViv* 4a7f.

7. *PSkBh* 34b3-5.

8. *PSkV* 4a4f. and *PSkViv* 4b6f. See also *AS\** 13,6. On Stthiramati’s understanding of *ākāśa*, see KRAMER 2012, 127f.

9. *PSkBh* 35a1f.

10. *PSkV* 4b2f. The same list appears in *ASBh* 3,4.

11. *PSkV* 4b4. See also *ASBh* 3,5f.

12. *PSkV* 4b4. See also *ASBh* 3,7.

13. *PSkV* 4b4f. See also *ASBh* 3,8f.

14. *PSkV* 4b5. See also *ASBh* 3,6.

15. *PSkV* 4b5f. See also *ASBh* 3,9f.

16. *PSkV* 5a3-5. Though the terminology found in the Tibetan translation of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* is identical to the Tibetan rendering of the *PSkV* (see *AS<sub>T</sub>* 46a4f., *PSk<sub>T</sub>* 11b6f., and *PSkV<sub>T</sub>* 198b1-3: *sra ba nyid*, *gsher ba nyid*, *tsha ba nyid*, *yang zhing g.yo ba nyid*), the terms given by Pradhan in his reconstruction of the Sanskrit text differ from those in the *PSkV*: *kāṭhinatā*, *niṣyandatā*, *uṣṇatā*, *kampanatā* (see *AS\** 3,14-16). The respective terms found in *ASBh* 8,18 are *khara*, *sneha*, *uṣṇatā*, *traṇā*.

17. *PSkV* 5b1f.

18. *PSkV* 5b1-5, *PSkViv* 5a1-3, and *PSkBh* 36b1-5.

19. While this is what the Sanskrit text seems to mean (*PSkV* 5b3: *-patradalapākoṣṇatā-*), the text preserved in the Tibetan translation is as follows: *padma'i 'dab ma rgyas pa* (translated in ENGLE 2009, 252, as “the development of a lotus blossom”, and explained on p. 462, n. 58, as “the fact that a plant can develop in water”). See also *PSkBh* 36b3, where the argument is definitely aiming at the rotting of leaves and warm water.

20. In connection with the presence of the earth element in a burning fire the *Pañcaskandhabhāṣya*

also mentions the ability of flames to support leaves etc. (*PSkBh* 36b4f.).

21. *PSkBh* 36b3.

22. *PSkBh* 36a6-36b1. For the edition and translation of the parallel passage in the *Garbhāvākṛāntisūtra*, see KRITZER (forthcoming). The Tibetan text found in the extant versions of the *Garbhāvākṛāntisūtra* is not identical to the *Pañcaskandhabhāṣya*'s reading and it is difficult to say if the author of the *Pañcaskandhabhāṣya* has changed and abbreviated the text or if he was quoting from a different version of the *sūtra*.

23. According to the *Pañcaskandhaka* the matter dependent on the basic elements consists of the five sense faculties, their five objects, and the *avijñapti* (*PSk* 2,3-5). The explanation of AS\* 3, 16-18 is very similar, though the last category, the *avijñapti*, is extended to “matter included in the *dharmāyatana*”. The answer to the question, what the five *indriyas* are, given in the *Pañcaskandhaka* is: “pellucid matter having colour as its object”, “... having sound as its object”, etc. (*PSk* 2,6-10). The definition found in AS\* 3,18f. differs somewhat. There it is said that the faculty of seeing is pellucid matter dependent on the four *mahābhūtas*, which is the basis for visual perception (*cakṣurvijñāna*). See also *AKBh* 5,25ff., where a similar explanation is given.

24. *PSkV* 6a5f.

25. *PSkV* 6a6-b5. For further remarks on this passage in Sthiramati's commentary and on the corresponding section in the *Pañcaskandhabhāṣya*, see SCHMITHAUSEN (forthcoming), § 52.

26. *PSkV* 7a6.

27. AS\* 3,23-26 and *AKBh* 6,8 and 6,16f. The *Abhidharmasamuccaya* does not mention the expressions “colour” and “shape” explicitly in this context, but gives a list of different colours and shapes.

28. The four colours are blue (*nīla*), yellow (*pīṭa*), red (*lohita*), white (*avadāta*) and the eight shapes include long (*dīrgha*), short (*hrasva*), square (*vṛtta*), round (*parimaṇḍala*), high (*unnata*), low (*avanata*), even (*sāta*), uneven (*visāta*). See *PSkV* 7b1f. and 5, AS\* 3,24f., and *AKBh* 6,11.

29. See AS\* 3,25f. (and AS<sub>r</sub> 46b2) and also *ASBh* 3,14f. The *Abhidharmasamuccaya* states that all the different categories of visible matter can be of three kinds: beautiful (*kha dog bzang po*), not beautiful (*kha dog ngan pa*), or neither of these two (see AS\* 4,1 and AS<sub>r</sub> 46b3f.).

30. *PSkV* 7b2f.

31. *PSkViv* 6a1 and *PSkBh* 38b6-39a1.

32. *PSkV* 8a6f. See also *PSkBh* 39a4-6 for examples of *viññapti* “making known” a pure or a hateful mind.

33. See e.g. *AKBh* 195,7ff.

34. *AKBh* 192,20ff. and 196,1f. For a more detailed description of the discussion of *saṃsthāna* existing either as a real entity or as a mere designation (*prajñaptisat*), see KARUNADASA 1967, 50-52.

35. *AKBh* 6,16f. Another example for *rūpa* consisting of mere shape without colour exists in objects seen at a distance (see *AKBh* 195,12f.).

36. *AKBh* 195,16f.

37. *PSkV* 8a\*4-7. (The scribe has erroneously omitted a part of the text, which was subsequently added on an additional folio. As both folios are marked as folio 8 in the manuscript, for the sake of clarity I am referring to the additional folio as 8\*.)

38. *PSkV* 8b4-6.

39. *PSkV* 9a6f.

40. *PSkV* 9b4, *AKBh* 6,22, AS\* 4,3, and *ASBh* 3,19f.

41. *PSkV* 9b5f., *AKBh* 6,23f., and *ASBh* 3,19. *ASBh* 3,20 has only *vrkṣa* as the sound that is not appropriated.

42. AS\* 4,3 and *PSk* 2,13f.

43. *ASBh* 3,20 and *PSkV* 9b6. See also *PSkViv* 6a7 and *PSkBh* 39b3.

44. *AKBh* 6,24-7,1.

45. See, e.g., SCHMITHAUSEN 1987, 262, n. 101. Vasubandhu does not explicitly mention the example of the sound of a hand and a drum in the *Pañcaskandhaka*, but he clearly accepts the position of a sound being *upātta* and *anupātta* simultaneously (see *PSk* 2,13f.).

46. *AKBh* 6,24.

47. *AKBh* 6,22f.

48. AS\* 4,3f. and *ASBh* 3,20-22. The *siddhohanīta* and the *parikalpita* sounds are explained in *ASBh* 3,21 as sounds communicated by the *Āryas* (*āryair deśitah*) on the one hand or by the non-Buddhists

(*tīrthyair deśītaḥ*) on the other. The reconstruction of these two and the following two categories offered by Pradhan (see AS\* 4,4: *siddhohanīto vā parikalpīto vā āryair deśīto vā tīrthyair deśīto vā*) seems to be wrong when compared to the commentary found in the *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya* and to the Tibetan translation of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* (AS<sub>T</sub> 46b5f.): *grub pas bstan pa dang/ kun brtags pa dang/ 'phags pas tha snyad btags pa dang/ 'phags pa ma yin pas tha snyad btags pa'o*. The phrases *āryair deśītaḥ* and *tīrthyair deśītaḥ* do not describe additional categories, but are the respective definitions of the *siddhohanīta* and the *parikalpīta* sounds. The correct expression for the last two categories of sound is found in ASBh 3,21: *āryānāryavyāvahārikau*.

49. AS\* 4,2.

50. PSkV 39b1-3 and PSkViv 6a7-6b2.

51. AKBh 7,5f.

52. PSk 3,1f.

53. PSkV 9b6. My understanding of the phrase *indriyamahābhūtānām* as “basic elements of the sense [of smell]” follows ENGLE 2009, 259. Notably, the *Pañcaskandhabhāṣya* (PSkV 39b6) explains smell “other than that” (*de las gzhan pa*) as “neither benefiting nor harming the five sense faculties and the four basic elements” (*dbang po lnga dang 'byung ba chen po bzhi la phan par yang mi byed gnod par yang mi byed pa ste*).

54. PSkV 10a1f.

55. AS\* 4,5f. and ASBh 3,24f.

56. PSkViv 6b3f. and PSkV 39b5-40a1.

57. AKBh 7,4.

58. AS\* 4,7-9.

59. PSkViv 6b4-6 and PSkV 40a2-4.

60. AS<sub>T</sub> 47a1-3 (see also the reconstruction in AS\* 4,10-12, where in addition *uṣṇatva* is mentioned).

61. PSkV 11b2f.

62. The *Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā* mentions only water as the main constituent of cold (PSkV 11b4f.). However, the *Pañcaskandhabhāṣya* (PSkV 41a4) and a number of other texts which include a parallel listing (e.g. PSkPra 242b1 and AKBhTT *tho* 48b4) have *chu dang rlung* (“water and wind”) as the main basic elements of cold. A similar statement is also to be found in ASBh 3,27.

63. PSkV 11b4f. and PSkV 41a3f.

64. PSkV 11a6f. See also PSkViv 7a1f. and PSkV 40b4-7.

65. PSk 3,8f.

66. AKBh 8,9. Sthiramati also classifies *avijñapti* as being *kuśala* or *akuśala* (PSkV 12a1). However, the two terms are missing in the Tibetan translation of the *Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā* (PSkV<sub>T</sub> 203a7). In contrast to *avijñapti*, which can never be neutral (*avyākṛta*) (see AKBh 200,25), *vijñapti* might be *kuśala*, *akuśala*, or *avyākṛta* (see AKBh 201,2 and PSkV 12a2). The reason for this classification of *avijñapti* as either morally good or bad might be explained by the fact that *avijñapti* was introduced to justify the karmic results of actions that cannot be perceived directly in opposition to the visible actions of body and speech (i.e. *kāya-* and *vāgvijñapti*). Therefore an *avijñapti* not having karmic consequences would be ineffective and purposeless.

67. See AS\* 4,13 and also ASBh 4,4, where the category *sāmādānika* is defined as *avijñapti*.

68. PSkV 12a2-6. See also AS\* 58,8f. and ASBh 69,7f. “Neither restraint nor non-restraint” refers to good or bad activities of those who are not committed to a continuous beneficial or unbeneficial way of living like monks etc. on the one hand and those who kill animals as part of their profession (e.g. hunters) on the other. See SANDERSON 1994, 39f.

69. AKBh 205,12f.

70. See AS\* 57,3.

71. AKBh 205,15 and AS\* 57,4f.

72. PSkV 12a6f.

73. PSkV 12b1f. In AKBh 201,8-11 Vasubandhu defends the view that *avijñapti* can only be produced in *kāma-* and *rūpadhātu*, not in *ārūpyadhātu*. The arising of *avijñapti* is impossible in the sphere without matter, as *avijñapti* is dependent on the *mahābhūtas*, which, of course, do not exist there. Vasubandhu rejects the opponent’s assumption that it should be possible to produce *avijñapti* in *ārūpyadhātu* just as uncontaminated *avijñapti* is produced by someone existing in the *rūpadhātu*. In contrast to uncontaminated *avijñapti*, which does not fall under the division of the three *dhātus*, an *avijñapti*

belonging to *ārūpyadhātu* could not be produced dependent on elements which belong to another sphere.

74. See *AKBh* 9,18-10,5 and 196,4ff.

75. See *PSkV* 13a5-14a2.

76. *PSkV* 13b1.

77. *AKBh* 196,8ff. and 197,3ff.

78. *PSkV* 13b2-4.

79. *PSkV* 13b4-14a2.

80. See *SaṅSū* III.23.

81. *AKBh* 196,8f.

82. *PSkV* 12b3-5.

83. *AS\** 4,12-14, *ASBh* 4,3-5, and *PSkV* 12b5.

84. See also ENGLE 2009, 264, who translates the explanation of *ābhyavakāśika* as “they are intangible in the sense that they do not obstruct anything”. It is difficult to discern the subtle difference between the atomic matter of the category *ābhisamkṣepika* and that of *ābhyavakāśika*. The first kind of matter possibly refers to the ordinary atoms that constitute the material objects, whereas the second relates to the (dark or light) matter of holes, like the opening of a door or the mouth. See *AKBh* 18,9-17, where *ākāśadhātu* is defined as the material space of the opening of doors etc.

85. *PSkV* 13a2.

86. *ASBh* 4,3-5 and *PSkV* 12b6-13a2. On the eight *vimokṣas*, see KRAMER 2005, 146f.

87. *PSkV* 12b6-13a2.

88. *PSkV* 13a2-4.

89. See *AKBh* 196,12.

90. *AKBh* 197,4-6.

91. *PSkV* 42b2-4 and 43b1f.

92. *AKBh* 199,16ff. and *PSkV* 12b2.

93. *PSkV* 42b4-7.

94. *AKBh* 222,17-225,18.

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